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  Argentina’s GDP per working age person in 2003 was about the same as it was 
twenty years earlier and around fifteen percent below trend (Figure 1). By international 
standards that has been a dismal performance whose ultimate sources are important to 
uncover to eventually reverse that country’s seemingly secular decline. 
  The purpose of this paper is precisely to take a first step towards that 
understanding. To that effect, we examine Argentina’s recent growth experience, which 
includes two deep recessions and a recovery, with the lens of a neoclassical growth 
model that takes total factor productivity as exogenous.   
  The assumption that total factor productivity (TFP hereafter) is exogenous is 
obviously limited, but it is a useful abstraction to answer a well defined question: which 
part of Argentina’s GDP growth in the last twenty five years or so can be attributed to 
TFP growth and which part to factor accumulation? This question continues to be the 
object of considerable debate in the literature, since it has been argued that TFP-driven 
growth, as opposed to factor accumulation driven growth, can have very different 
implications.  
  For example, Young (1995) has argued that the economic miracle of the so-called 
Asian tigers has been mostly the result of higher labor participation rates and capital 
accumulation, not of improvements in overall (TFP) productivity.  
  That distinction is particularly important for the case of Argentina, because Figure 
2 shows another striking fact about that country’s recent economic history: capital per 
working age adult was in 2003 about twenty percent lower than it had been twenty years 
earlier. That implies that real wages for unqualified workers are today considerably lower 
than they were for their parents, as well as a substantial deterioration in the distribution of 
income. In order to correct this depressing fact, it is important to understand what may 
have caused it in the first place. 
  The situation is even more dramatic if one takes into account that, according to 
the neoclassical growth model, Argentina’s capital stock per working age adult should 
have been in 2003 about twenty five percent higher than it was in 1980 if total factor 
productivity had kept growing at the one percent average annual rate at which it did over 
the period 1951-79. Instead, as mentioned before, the capital stock in 2003 was twenty 
  1percent lower than in 1980. That means that by 2003 Argentina’s capital stock per 
working age population was about forty five percent lower than its trend value. We refer 
to this difference between what the capital stock per working age person should have 
been according to historical trends and what it actually was in 2003 as “Argentina’s 
capital gap.” 
  Figure 3 suggests a culprit for that gap: the level of total factor productivity was 
the same in Argentina in 2003 as it was in 1980, when according to its historical one 
percent annual growth rate, it should have been at least twenty five percent higher.  
  Thus, a natural candidate to account for Argentina’s “capital gap” seems to be a 
worse than average total factor productivity growth (in fact, complete stagnation of it) 
during the last twenty five years. 
  That is precisely the hypothesis we explored in Kydland and Zarazaga (2002). 
There we found that indeed most of the decline of Argentina’s capital stock over the so-
called “lost decade” of the 1980s (a depression, in the definition of Kehoe and Prescott 
(2002)) can be attributed almost entirely to the dynamics of a declining total factor 
productivity over the same period.  
  In this paper, we extend that previous study up to the year 2003 and confirm the 
same finding for the more recent recession of the period 1999-2003: as it was the case for 
the previous recession of the 1980s, GDP and the capital stock declined also at the pace 
that the neoclassical growth model would have predicted in the face of declining total 
factor productivity. 
  In other words, at least for the case of Argentina, the neoclassical growth model 
seems to account remarkably well for the dynamics of that country’s capital stock during 
recessions. Based on this observation, an impartial observer might be tempted to 
conclude that Argentina’s declining capital stock is the counterpart of a long spell of 
declining total factor productivity.  
  Yet, comparison of Figures 2 and 3 would prove that conclusion premature. 
According to Figure 3, total factor productivity was the same in 2003 as it was in 1980, and 
therefore, the capital stock per working age person should have remained roughly constant, 
instead of declining the twenty percent mentioned earlier and apparent in Figure 2. 
  2  In other words, in the light of the neoclassical growth model, a weak performance 
of total factor productivity over Argentina’s last two recessions can account for about 
half of that country’s capital gap. The remaining half originates in the puzzling behavior 
that the capital stock exhibited over the boom of the 1990s. Over the period 1990-98, 
total factor productivity grew at stellar annual rates of four percent per year, yet the 
capital stock per working age adult barely grew at the historical average rate of about one 
percent, well below the rates that the neoclassical growth model would have predicted.  
  It is not clear yet why investment was in the 1990s lower than it should have been 
according to the neoclassical growth model. Some may argue that policies in place during 
those years may account for the anomaly. However, a distinct possibility is that the 
insufficient recovery of investment in the 1990s reflected a lack of investors’ confidence, 
prompted by a prior history of recurrent devaluations, bank deposits freezes, and default 
in government obligations. 
  In summary, the poor performance of total factor productivity during the lost 
decade depression of the 1980s and the more recent 1999-2002 recession seems to be 
able to account for about half of “Argentina’s capital gap,” that is, of the deviations of the 
capital stock per working age person relative to trend. The other half remains 
unexplained. Recent literature on endogenous credit constraints however suggests a 
prime suspect for that anomaly:  the presence of a severe time inconsistency problem, 
hinted at by a problematic past of defaults and confiscations.  
  Future research will have to explore that conjecture more formally, but the 
evidence and analysis presented in this paper suggests that capital markets don’t “forgive 
and forget” defaults and confiscations as quickly as many experts and policymakers seem 
to believe. Like the mythical frogs happily swimming in the pot in which they are being 
slowly boiled, the citizens of defaulting countries may fail to notice the relentless 
deterioration of their standards of living inevitably associated with a capital stock that is 
not being fully replenished as it reaches obsolescence.  
  The large fraction of the decline in Argentina’s capital stock that cannot be 
accounted for by a neoclassical growth model (that rules out defaults by assumption) 
suggests that those costs may be large. As already mentioned, this conjecture needs to be 
investigated more rigorously before jumping to conclusions, but the findings in this paper 
  3merit at least an early warning that countries may not, in the end, escape defaults and 
confiscations as unscathed as is widely believed.
1  
  The remaining sections of this paper briefly describe the neoclassical growth 
model that we calibrated to the main features of Argentina’s economy and discuss in 
more detail the findings summarized in this introduction.  
 
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
 
Model 
  We use the stochastic growth model. All variables are in per capita terms. 
  Household preferences can be represented by: 
) 1 /( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 1 1
0





t l c E       (2) 
 
where ct  represents consumption, lt  the fraction of the time endowment devoted to work, 
α the utility-function share parameter,  η the population growth rate, and σ  the 
coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (or the reciprocal of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of the composite commodity.) 
  Technology is described by 
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where kt is the capital stock, xt is investment,  zt a stochastic technological shock and θ is 
the capital input share in national income. The model assumes labor augmenting 
technological progress at the rate γ. On the balanced growth path, output, consumption 
and capital grow at the rate (1 + η) (1 + γ). 
                                     
1 It is reassuring that a similar “early warning” about the potentially large costs of sovereign debt defaults 
has also been issued in a recent paper by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). 
  4Calibration  
  The model economy is calibrated by choosing parameters so that the balanced 
growth path matches certain steady-state features of the measured economies (see Cooley 
and Prescott (1995)). 
  We chose the period 1951-79 to establish the long run features of Argentina’s 
growth rather than the whole period for which the relevant data are available (1951-97) 
because, in the spirit of calibration, the period 1951-79 does not include any of the 
observations corresponding to the two decades that are the object of study in this paper. 
That is, we calibrate Argentina’s economy to its long run features as revealed by the 
information available to the economic agents by 1979 and ask whether a neoclassical 
growth model thus calibrated can account reasonably well for Argentina’s relevant 
growth features afterwards, during the lost decade and subsequent recovery of the 1990s. 
  Consistent with that choice of reference period, the following parameters (with 
their actual values in parentheses) were set to their average value over 1951-79: annual 
growth rate of working-age population (1.55%), labor augmenting technological progress 
(TFP factor, 1.03 percent,) and the investment-output ratio (0.226). 
  It would be tempting to set the average capital-output ratio to its average over that 
period as well. However, unlike with the average TFP growth, this procedure is likely to 
underestimate the underlying long run capital-output ratio if in the reference period the 
economy is not on the balanced growth path, but converging to it from “above” or 
“below.” As per the evidence discussed in the previous section, the latter seems to have 
been the case for Argentina during the reference period. Accordingly, the underlying long 
run capital-output ratio is likely to be closer in magnitude to the ratios actually observed 
toward the end of that period than to their average over that same period. Given that the 
observed capital output ratio for Argentina was still in an upward trend by the time it 
reached values of around 1.9 in 1978 and 1979, we adopted 2 as a reasonable guess for 
the value of that ratio in the long run.
2  
  That calibrated capital-output ratio along with the investment-output share of 
0.226 calibrated earlier implies a depreciation rate of about 11.3 percent, via the standard 
neoclassical growth model steady state relationship δ = (x/y)/(k/y). This depreciation rate 
                                     
2 However, sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are quite sensitive to the choice of this value. 
  5abstracts from total factor productivity growth and population growth because the model 
economy used for the numerical experiments assumes no growth. Hansen (1997) has 
shown that this way of calibrating the depreciation rate ensures a better correspondence 
between the series generated by the model and the actual data of an economy with 
growth. 
Another parameter that is particularly challenging to calibrate for the case of 
Argentina is the capital share parameter θ of the production function. The National 
Income accounts typically used to that effect in countries like the US are not available in 
Argentina, which can therefore estimate its GDP only from the Product accounts. As a 
result, the labor and capital cost shares in GDP cannot be calculated directly from 
reported factor incomes. Therefore, we set the capital input share, θ, to 0.40, as if 
Argentina’s production technology were the same as that of the US. While some 
estimates have the capital share at 60 percent of GDP, most researchers consider that this 
figure would be closer to 40 percent were it not for the substantial under-reporting of 
labor income in the informal sector of Argentina’s economy.
3
The steady-state real interest rate, was set equal to 8.7 %, as implied by the steady 
state relationship r =  θ.Y/K – δ, (again, abstracting for the reasons previously given from 
long-run growth rates.)  
The utility-function share parameter, α, was set to imply that the average 
household member spends a fraction 0.3 of its time endowment in the labor market, a 
standard assumption for the US that casual inspection of the available data suggests 
reasonable for Argentina as well.   
 The coefficient of constant relative risk aversion was set at the level used in 
similar studies for the United States, that is, σ = 2. 
Finally, the persistence parameter ρ, the autoregressive component of the total factor 
productivity shock, was established from an autoregression on the Solow residuals (TFP) 
computed in the previous section of the paper for the period 1951-79, and set, 
                                     
3 De Gregorio and Lee (1999) find that the labor share could be as large as 0.7, according to the indirect 
measure proposed by Sarel (1997). 
 
  6accordingly, equal to 0.56. The innovation (εt) is assumed to be an i.i.d. process with 




In our numerical experiments, we exploit the second welfare theorem to compute 
the solution of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium neoclassical growth model. 
Since σ > 1, 0 ≤ α ≤1 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, the conditions for the second welfare theorem hold. 
In particular, the utility function is concave, and the production function defines a convex 
set for the resource constraint. This will guarantee that the solution to the social planner’s 
problem can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Notice that this problem is a 
version of the stochastic growth model first developed by Brock and Mirman (1972). 
Our strategy to compute the only solution of the model is to find the value 
function and associated policy (or allocation) functions. Following Kydland and Prescott 
(1982) we substitute the resource constraint in the utility function and rewrite the 
resulting expression as a quadratic approximation around the steady state. This defines a 
linear quadratic problem with well known properties. In particular, the policy (or 
allocation) functions are linear in the state variables and can be readily computed with 
standard numerical methods (see Hansen and Prescott (1995)).  
Following the standard convention in that approach, the policy functions and 
resulting allocations are computed under the assumption that economic agents form 
expectations about the future rationally, based on the information available at the 




  In this section, we ask what fraction of the growth rates of the relevant economic 
variables over the period 1980-2003 can be accounted for by a stochastic neoclassical 
growth model in which exogenous shocks to TFP are the only source of uncertainty. To 
that effect, as indicated in the previous section, we compute the equilibrium decision 
rules and simulate the path of the relevant variables of the model by feeding the measured 
TFP into the equilibrium decision rules. 
  7 
Findings 
As Figures 4 and 5 make apparent, the growth model with TFP taken as 
exogenous can account with remarkable precision for the dynamics of output and capital 
accumulation during the protracted and deep recession of the 1980s, in fact, a depression, 
according to Kehoe and Prescott’s definition. 
The model seems to miss completely the dynamics of capital stock after the lost 
decade, but that is the result of a considerable overestimation of that stock over the 
expansion of the 1990s. Once that effect is taken away, as in Figures 7, 8 and 9, by 
restarting the simulations with the actual level of capital stock observed in 1999, the 
neoclassical growth model shows again a striking ability to replicate the trajectory of 
GDP and of the capital stock during recessions. 
Inspection of Figure 8 confirms the presence of an asymmetry in the ability of the 
neoclassical growth model to account for the dynamics of capital accumulation: although 
it captures it rather well during recessions, it seems to considerably overestimate the 
capital stock during expansions. The “1990s excess capital shallowing puzzle,” reflected 
in a lower than predicted capital-output ratio and first discussed in Kydland and Zarazaga 
(2003), is apparent also from Figure 9.  
Thus, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, taken together these findings suggest that 
the relevant question for future research might be not so much whether the neoclassical 
growth model can account for depressions, but for booms. A resolution of the “1990s 
puzzle” for Argentina could have therefore important implications for growth theory in 
general.  
In the next section we offer some conjectures that might help to explain that 
anomaly. 
 
 CONJECTURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CAPITAL GAP ANOMALY 
Given Argentina’s history of defaults and confiscation of deposits, a valid 
conjecture to account for its capital gap relative to trend is the possibility of endogenous 
credit constraints of the type discussed in Kehoe and Levine (2001) and Alvarez and 
Jermann (2000). A growing body of literature suggests that small open economies face 
  8borrowing constraints that are binding not as much during downturns but during 
expansions (see, for example, Kehoe and Perri (2002)). The reason for that 
counterintuitive outcome is that lenders do not have much interest anyway in investing in 
a country undergoing a period of low or declining productivity growth. By contrast, 
capital owners would like to invest a lot during a period of high productivity growth. The 
presence of default risk reduces their incentives to do so, however, because investors 
realize that it is at good times, after it has been able to lure capital into the country, that 
its governments will have the highest incentives to increase taxes on capital, perhaps to 
the point of confiscation.  
Thus, a possible explanation of why investment remained so weak (relative to the 
model) in Argentina during the 1990s is that potential investors, their memories of that 
country’s sovereign debt default in the mid 1980s and confiscation of deposits in 1990 
still fresh, remained wary of similar episodes in the future and, accordingly didn’t risk 
their capital in Argentina as much as the neoclassical growth model would predict. 
Indeed, those fears have materialized recently, when in 2001 Argentina implemented the 
largest confiscation of deposits in its history and then proceeded to declare a massive 
default on its sovereign debt obligations. 
The social consequences of Argentina’s capital accumulation gap are devastating 
for the poorer segments of the population, as a declining capital is inevitably associated 
with lower labor productivity and, therefore, lower wages. As capital becomes the 
relatively scarcer factor of production, its relative price increases and induces a 
deterioration in the distribution of income as well. These predictions of the neoclassical 
growth model seem to be roughly consistent with the rise of poverty and inequality 
observed in Argentina over the last years. 
This study suggests, therefore, that rebuilding Argentina’s capital stock and 
bringing it back to what it should have been according to trend is a fundamental 
component of any attempt to reduce poverty and social marginalization. We had 
conjectured, however, that the capital-shallowing process responsible for that unfortunate 
evolution of social indicators is the result, at least in part, of a long history of confiscation 
of deposits and debt defaults that has seriously dented investors’ confidence in the 
country. In the light of that conjecture, any attempt to fight poverty without solving the 
  9time inconsistency problem revealed by that problematic history will be likely doomed to 
failure. 
It is therefore important that future work explores more rigorously the extent to 
which the “risk of default” conjecture can account quantitatively for the impoverishing 
capital-shallowing process that Argentina has been experiencing over the last twenty five 
years or so, ultimately responsible for that country’s recent rise in poverty and inequality 
that is worrying experts, policymakers, international financial institutions, and well-
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Figure 2
ARGENTINA
Capital input per working age person



























































































































































































































































































































































































































  12Figure 6
ARGENTINA























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model restarted  












  14References 
 
Alvarez, F. and Jermann, U. J. (2000):“Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with  
   Risk of Default,” Econometrica 68(4), July 2000: pp 775-797. 
 
Brock, William A. and Leonard J. Mirman (1972) “Optimal Economic Growth and  
   Uncertainty: The Discounted Case,” Journal of Economic Theory 5, 479-513. 
 
Cooley, Thomas F. and Edward C. Prescott (1995) “Economic Growth and Business 
   Cycles,” in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Thomas F. Cooley, ed. Princeton,  
   N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
De Gregorio, José; and Jong-Wha Lee (1999) “Economic Growth in Latin America: 
    Sources and Prospects,” Documento de Trabajo No. 66, Serie Economía, December,  
    Centro de Economía Aplicada, Facultad de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile, 
    Santiago, Chile. 
 
Hansen, Gary D. and Edward C. Prescott (1995):“Recursive Methods for Computing 
   Equilibria of Business Cycle Models,” in Frontiers of Business Cycle Research,    
   Thomas F. Cooley, ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kehoe, Timothy J. and David K. Levine (2001): "Liquidity Constrained Markets versus  
   Debt Constrained Markets," Econometrica 69: 575-98. 
 
Kehoe, Timothy J. and Edward C. Prescott (2002): “Great Depressions of the 20
th   
   Century,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 5(1): 1-18. 
 
Kehoe, Patrick, and Fabrizio Perri (2002): “International Business Cycles With         
   Endogenous Incomplete Markets,” Econometrica 70/3 (May): pp. 907-928 . 
 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1982): “Time to Build and Aggregate  
   Fluctuations,” Econometrica 50:1345-70. 
 
Kydland, Finn E. and Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga (2002): “Argentina’s Lost Decade,”  
   Review of Economic Dynamics, 5(1): 152-165. 
 
Reinhart, Carmen M., Kenneth S. Rogoff and Miguel A. Savastano (2003): “Debt      
   Intolerance,” National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 9908. 
 
Sarel, M. (1997) “Growth and Productivity in Asean Countries,” IMF Working Paper    
   WP/97/97. 
 
Young, Alwyn (1995): “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of  
   the East Asian Growth Experience.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (August):     
   641-80 
 
  15Elías, Víctor J. (1992) “Sources of Growth: A Study of Seven Latin American    
   Countries,” ICS Press, San Francisco, California. 
 
Hofman, André A. (1991) “The Economic Development of Latin America in the     
   Twentieth Century,” Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA, USA. 
 
Hansen, Gary D. (1997) “Technical Progress and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Journal of  
   Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, 1005-23. 
 
Kehoe, Timothy and Edward C. Prescott (2002): “Great Depressions of the 20
th Century,”     
   Review of Economic Dynamics 5: 1-18. 
 
Kydland, Finn E. and Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga (2002a): “Argentina’s Lost Decade,”    
   Review of Economic Dynamics 5: 152-165. 
 
_____________________________________ (2002b): “Argentina’s Recovery and 
    Excess Capital Shallowing of the 1990s,” Estudios de Economía (Universidad de    
    Chile) 
 
Meloni, Osvaldo (1999) “Crecimiento Potencial y Productividad en Argentina,”  
   Secretaría de Programación Económica y Regional, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
 
Parente, Stephen and Edward C. Prescott (1999): “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to  
   Riches,” American Economic Review (December): 1216-1233. 
 
 
 
  16